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Regulatory Framework
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20100027489 2019-08-29T18:27:55+00:00Z
Where Certification Fits
• Routine access to the NAS for UAS hinges on 
establishing that UAS can operate safely in the NAS
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– Technologies that enable safe operation
• Separation assurance
• Communication
• Command and Flight Control
• Human Factors/Pilot Aircraft Interfaces
– A regulatory framework that defines safe operation
• acceptable means of compliance to the Federal Aviation 
Regulations (FARs) through standards and other guidance
Context
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"UAS operation in civil airspace means 
flight over populated areas must not raise 
concerns based on overall levels of 
airworthiness; therefore, 
UAS standards cannot vary widely 
from those for manned aircraft 
without raising public and regulatory 
concern."
– from FY2009–2034 Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap
Scope
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Federal Aviation Regulations
(FARs)
Regulatory Framework for UAS
Aircraft Operations People
AirworthinessType Design Production
Certification
Certification & Airworthiness
Certification includes regulations, standards 
and other guidance necessary to provide 
assurance of the intrinsic safety and 
airworthiness of an aircraft
• conforms to its type design and is in a condition for 
safe flight 
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Certification
Data
Key concepts :
• assuring that systems and equipment perform their intended 
functions under any foreseeable operating condition
• assuring that unintended functions are improbable
- from FAR 23 & 25.1309
Certification Issues
6
 Working with existing regulations for a relatively few aircraft 
types and operations, when there are many diverse UAS types 
and operations 
 Working without the benefit of relevant data to support risk 
assessment and regulation development
– incident and accident data
– reliability data
 Knowing that the pilot in command may not always be capable 
of discontinuing flight when un-airworthy mechanical, 
electrical, or structural conditions occur 
 Increased reliance on automation (especially software) for 
safety
Airworthiness Requirements
 These requirements drive the design of systems and equipment
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Classification 
of Failure 
Conditions
No Safety 
Effect
Minor Major Hazardous Catastrophic
Part 23 
Class I
No 
Requirement
<10-3
Level D
<10-4
Level C
<10-5
Level C
<10-6
Level C
Part 23 
Class II
No 
Requirement
<10-3
Level D
<10-5
Level C 
<10-6
Level C 
<10-7
Level C
Part 23 
Class III
No 
Requirement
<10-3
Level D
<10-5
Level C
<10-7
Level C
<10-8
Level B
Part 23 
Class IV
Commuter
No 
Requirement
<10-3
Level D
<10-5
Level C
<10-7
Level B
<10-9
Level A
Part 25
Transport
No 
Requirement
<10-5
Level D
<10-5
Level C
<10-7
Level B
<10-9
Level A
Allowable Probabilities of failure & Design assurance levels
What would be acceptable for UAS?
A general classification scheme that enables determination of 
appropriate values is still a challenge! 8
Classification 
of Failure 
Conditions
No Safety 
Effect
Minor Major Hazardous Catastrophic
UAS
Class I?
No 
Requirement ? ? ? ?
UAS
Class II?
No 
Requirement ? ? ? ?
UAS
Class III?
No 
Requirement ? ? ? ?
…
No 
Requirement ? ? ? ?
Complying with 1309 requirements
Classification/Airworthiness Conundrum
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severity of the consequence of a failure in a UAS
linked with environment / context / service
Guidelines for the 
Approval of the 
Provision and 
Use of Air Traffic 
Services 
Supported by 
Data 
Communications"   
DO-264
• What parameters are needed for UAS 
classification that facilitate definition of 1309-
type requirements?
• Can we take a service-based approach?
– using RTCA/DO-264 for a specific UAS service
 for example, fire monitoring, communication tower
Type Design
• What is needed to facilitate UAS designs that can comply with 
airworthiness standards?
– lessons learned from incident and accident data
 from use in military context and use under COAs
– reliability data for system components unique to UAS
– assessment of UAS-specific hazards and risks
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Type Design consists of the 
drawings and specifications 
necessary to define aircraft 
configuration and design features 
needed to comply with 
airworthiness standards
Best practices for UAS design for airworthiness
AirworthinessType Design Production
Certification
Criteria/Best Practices 
for UAS Type Design
Airworthiness Standards
Certification Objective 1
• Objective 1:  Provide regulators with a methodology for development of 
airworthiness requirements for certification of UAS
– Rationale:  a comprehensive methodology does not currently exist to 
support development of regulation for certification of UAS.  Regulation is 
essential to enable routine access to the NAS.
– Approach: 
1) assess existing approaches and classification schemes for deriving acceptable 
means of compliance to airworthiness requirements
2) investigate a service-based approach to classification of UAS 
3) conduct comparative analysis of different methodologies 
4) work with FAA to determine best approach and conduct case study 
5) participate in regulatory/standards organizations developing safety and 
performance requirements for UAS
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Certification Objective 1
– Deliverables:   
FY Deliverable To Used For
11 Initial assessment of approaches to 
airworthiness requirements
FAA Decision aid for formulation of UAS 
airworthiness standards
12 Report on service-based approach 
to UAS classification 
FAA Decision aid for formulation of UAS 
airworthiness standards
12 Comparative analysis of 
certification methodologies for UAS 
FAA Decision aid for formulation of UAS 
airworthiness standards
14 Case study of certification 
methodology 
FAA Decision aid for formulation of UAS 
airworthiness standards
15 Final report on UAS certification 
methodology
FAA Decision aid for formulation of UAS 
airworthiness standards
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Certification Objective 2 
• Objective 2: Provide regulators and industry with hazard and risk-related 
data to support criteria for UAS type design
– Rationale: There is presently little UAS specific data (incident, accident, 
and reliability), especially in a civil context, to support risk assessment 
and development of standards and regulation.
– Approach: Identify gaps in existing data, provide measured data as 
needed, and formulate recommendations by:
1) evaluating UAS incident/accident data collection efforts and determining 
additional support necessary for regulation
2) assessing UAS-specific hazards and risks
3) evaluating need for reliability data for UAS-unique systems, components and 
subsystem, and determining additional measurement requirements
4) developing guidance and best practices for UAS type design
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Certification Objective 2 
– Deliverables: 
FY Deliverable To Used For
11 Report on gap analysis for 
UAS incident and accident 
data
FAA Determining needs for accident & 
incident reporting to support UAS 
regulation
11 Report on gap analysis for 
UAS component reliability  
FAA, 
Industry
Development of risk assessments 
and potential regulatory 
requirements
12 Report  on UAS hazards and 
risk assessment
FAA, 
Industry
Use in development of UAS 
regulation
12 Report on implications of 
hazard/risk to regulation
FAA, 
Industry
Development of risk assessments 
and potential regulatory 
requirements
15 UAS Type Design 
recommendations
FAA, 
Industry
Best practices for UAS developers & 
users
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Partnerships, Links, and Integrated 
Test and Evaluation
• Partnership with the FAA Tech Center and UAS Program 
Office, US Air Force, and US Army
– other informal coordination with RTCA SC-203, NATO STANAG 4671 
Custodial Support Team, and ASTM
• Links to FY10 In-Guide Funding
– linked with certification-related aspects of the roadmap and CONOPS
• Links to Integrated Test and Evaluation
– there are preliminary expectations for the case study to leverage IT&E 
simulation and flight tests
 difficult to clarify specific needs until the comparative analysis of approaches is 
complete 
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Facilities
– Simulation Development & Analysis Branch 
Simulators – Langley
o Test & Evaluation Simulator (TES)
o Differential Maneuvering Simulator (DMS)
– Air Traffic Operations Lab (ATOL) – Langley
– AirSTAR Ground Control Station/Mobile 
Operation Station (MOS)/Generic Transport 
Model (GTM) Simulator – Langley
– Manned surrogate UAS – Langley
– FAA Tech Center UAS and NextGen lab 
facilities – FAA Tech Center
– Ikhana – Dryden
• Supporting small UAS type design studies
– SUAVELab – Langley
– Electrochemistry Branch Testing Lab – Glenn
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Ground Station 
Environment
Existing
UAS 
Ground
Station
Simulated
Ground 
Stations
Unmanned 
Vehicle
Environment
Case-
Specific
UAS
Model
Specific
UAS
ATC
Environment
Virtual 
Research
ATC
NextGen
Lab
Terrain/Weather/ 
Other
Environment
Modeled
Environments
Specific 
UAS 
Environment
Notional Validation Architecture
supporting the case study
• That could support a certification case study
